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A Paradigm for the Analysis of the Legality of the Use of
Armed Force Against Terrorists and States that Aid and
Abet Them
Dr. Barry A. Feinstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is the scourge of the entire planet. It is an anathema and the
antithesis of respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and human
decency.' Global-security environment and international terrorism expert, Bruce
Hoffman, defined terrorism as "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear
through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change."2 He
continued:
[T]errorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological
effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack.
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1. See, e.g., Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Opening Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special
Session on Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2001), at http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/giuliani.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2003)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see also White House press secretary Scott McClellan, in Sarah el
Deeb, Bin Laden Said to Warn of Attacks in U.S. (Oct. 18, 2003), at http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story
&cid=514&e=l&u=/ap/20031018/ap-on.re mi ea/binladentpe_17 (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer).
2. BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 43 (Victor Gollancz ed., 1998), cited in Brad Roberts, America the
vulnerable? BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 55 (1), available at http://www.bullatomsci.org/
issues/ 1999/jf99/jf99reviews.html#anchor464756 (last visited Oct. 16, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer), cited in Kim Cragin & Peter Chalk, Terrorism & Development: Using Social and Economic Development to
Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism, RAND (2003), available at www.rand.org/publications/ MR/MR I630/MRI 630.pdf
(last viaited Oct. 16, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). The United States Department of State
defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience," cited in Rex A. Hudson, The
Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?, A Report Prepared under an Interagency
Agreement by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress 12 (Sept. 1999), at www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-
files/SocPsych-ofTerrorism.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer);
http://66.218.71.225/search/cache?p=%22Rex+A.+Hudson%22+and+%22who+becomes+a+terrorist+and+why%22+
and+%22Federal+Research+Division%22+and+%22Library+of+Congress%22&ei=UTF-8&n=20&fl=1&vl=lang en
&all=0&url=ObyRoTWLd9MJ:www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc-Psych-ofTerrorism.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2003)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). "Unable to achieve their unrealistic goals by conventional means,
international terrorists attempt to send an ideological or religious message by terrorizing the general public. Through
the choice of their targets, which are often symbolic or representative of the targeted nation, terrorists attempt to create
a high-profile impact on the public of their targeted enemy or enemies with their act of violence, despite the limited
material resources that are usually at their disposal. In doing so, they hope to demonstrate various points, such as that
the targeted government(s) cannot protect its (their) own citizens, or that by assassinating a specific victim they can
teach the general public a lesson about espousing viewpoints or policies antithetical to their own." Id.
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Terrorism is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider
"target audience" that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an
entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion
in general.... Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists
seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to
effect political change on either a local or an international scale.3
Terrorism poses an ominous threat to humanity4 and to the peace and security
of the world.5 It knows no international border, nor does it distinguish between
civilians and combatants. 6 In the past, terrorists typically armed with conventional
weaponry used such tactics in an attempt to bring attention to their cause, to gain
political support, and typically, to evoke a harsh response from the government
against whose citizens they acted in order to attain both domestic and international
support and sympathy. However, in today's ever-changing world of advanced
technology and increasing mobility, terrorists have changed their focus from
conventional to non-conventional warfare.7 Thus, modern-day terrorists seek, and
have the potential to acquire, weapons of mass destruction'-nuclear, biological,
and chemical. The idea that a nation-state would use non-conventional weapons
3. HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 43-44, cited in Craig & Chalk, supra note 2. In President George W.
Bush's Executive Order on Terrorist Financing Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons
Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism (Sept. 24, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010924-l.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer),
"the term 'terrorism' means an activity that-
(i) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and
(ii) appears to be intended-
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping,
or hostage-taking."
4. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli
Civilians, 45-46 (Oct. 2002), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA I 002.pdf (last visited
Oct. 18, 2003), also available at http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:ZbN7R3TTOpsJ:www.hrw.org/reports/
2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002.pdf+site:hrw.org+suicide+terrorism&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 (last visited Oct. 18,
2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
5. See, e.g., INT'L LAW COMMISSION, CODE OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF
MANKIND (Draft), arts. 2(4), 2(6), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/offences.htm (last visited Sept.
30, 2003) [hereinafter INT'L LAW COMMISSION] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
6. See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Addressing the opening session of the 53rd United Nations
General Assembly, partially cited in Judy Aita, Clinton Opens UN General Assembly with Call to Combat
Terrorism, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, Sept. 21, 1998, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topicalpollterror/
98092102.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
7. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to United Nations General Assembly,
USUN PRESS RELEASE # 162 (01) (Nov. 10, 2001), at http://www. un.int/usa/01162.htm (visited Sept. 5,
2003) [hereinafter Remarks to the United Nations] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer); The National
Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
8. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address by the President to the Philippine Congress (Oct. 18,
2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031018-12.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2003)
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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is frightening enough, but at least the "balance of fear" in the past helped to
minimize the chances of such an occurrence. 9 However, terrorists, by definition,
are characterized by their lack of adherence to the self-imposed restraints of
moral standards. ° Instead, they place "the cause" above all in the belief that the
end justifies the means used to achieve it. As United States President George W.
Bush, explained, "[deterrence-the promise of massive retaliation against
nations-means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or
citizens to defend."'"1
Against this background, the inherent eclectic, unpredictable, and indiscriminate
nature of terrorism has turned what' some excuse as acts of desperation by "victims of
oppression" into one of the greatest threats to the free world and modem civilization.
Recent events, particularly and unquestionably the horrifying suicide terrorist attacks
on the United States on September 11, 2001, have finally brought the world to the
realization that nothing can justify the murder of innocent civilians, and political and
social grievances of any particular group do not entitle that group to violate the basic
right to life of civilians.' 2 Regardless of its alleged objectives or who perpetrates it,
terrorism can never be legitimized.
Terrorists claim that they fight in the name of freedom and justice and that
they represent those suffering from subjugation and exploitation. However, it is
the free democratic societies that serve as prime and vulnerable targets for
terrorism.' 3 Ironically, it is the very moral strength of these societies' openness,
tolerance, and respect for human rights that makes them so susceptible to harm
by those driven by their antipathy to these Western moral standards. As a result,
the world today is often viewed as a dichotomy, with civilization on one end and
terrorism on the other.
4
9. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, The President's State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) [hereinafter
State of the Union] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
10. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address at the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12,
2002), at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/13434.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2003) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
11. President George W. Bush, Address by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United
States Military Academy at West Point, NY. (June 1, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/06/20020601-3.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Address at Graduation Exercise] (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer).
12. See, e.g., Giuliani, supra note 1. "The terrorists are wrong, and in fact evil, in their mass destruction
of human life in the name of addressing alleged injustices .... There is no excuse for mass murder .... Those
who practice terrorism - murdering or victimizing innocent civilians - lose any right to have their cause
understood by decent people and lawful nations." Id.
13. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 6.
14. See, e.g., Bush, Remarks to the United Nations, supra note 7; see also McClellan, supra note 1; The
National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 7. "Terrorists are enemies of the civilized world who
seek to spread fear and chaos and they have no regard for innocent life." Giuliani, supra note 1. "[T]here is no
room for neutrality on the issue of terrorism," explained Mayor Giuliani. "You're either with civilization or with
terrorists." Id. "This threat cannot be ignored," elucidated President Bush. "This threat cannot be appeased.
Civilization, itself, the civilization we share, is threatened." Bush, Remarks to the United Nations, supra note 7.
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The prevalent threat posed by terrorism to international peace, security, and
global stability'5 has resulted in a mounting awareness of its danger and extent. When
combined with the obvious responsibility and duty of every State to protect its
citizens,' 6 this awareness has helped bring at least some of the free world '7 to the
simple realization that in order to ensure the fundamental values of democracy,
freedom, liberty, and security for future generations, it is not only prudent but also
necessary to declare war on terrorism.'" The war on terror, however, is unlike any
other war the world has experienced.' 9 Even though the threat and actions of the
terrorist enemy emanate from within a State, this is a war against an enemy that does
not operate within clearly defined borders. In fact, this is not necessarily a war
against a given sovereign State. There is no clearly identified legitimate combatant
that adheres to international customs, laws, and rules of war. Moreover, rarely does
one know when, where, or how terrorists will next strike, or who or what their target
will be at any given time.' ° How then, can Western democracies that do adhere to the
rule of law engage in timely and effective defensive action against such an
amorphous2' and dreadful menace as terrorism? What protective actions may be
justified under international law?
15. See, e.g., Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: Motivations and Causes, TERRORISM RESEARCH CENTER (Jan.
1995), at http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=5693&mode=
thread&order=0&thold=0 (last visited Aug. 31, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
16. See, e.g., NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Sec. Donald Rumsfeld: Part 2, (PBS television broadcast, Feb.
4, 2002), transcript at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june02/rumsfeld-parttwo_2-4.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2003) [hereinafter NewsHour] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). "[W]e have no
choice but to defend ourselves, and the only way to do that is to go find them," Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld pointed out. "Certainly self-defense suggests that if we had reason to believe that that nexus was
being bridged or that al-Qaida. . . terrorists were being provided haven, clearly we have an obligation to try to
find them," concluded the Secretary of Defense. Id.
17. Wilkinson, supra note 15. "The true litmus test," explained Paul Wilkinson, "will be the Western
states' consistency and courage in maintaining a firm and effective policy against terrorism in all its forms. They
must abhor the idea that terrorism can be tolerated as long as it is only affecting someone else's democratic
rights and rule of law. They must adopt the clear principle that one democracy's terrorist is another democracy's
terrorist." Id.
18. See, e.g., Bush, Remarks to the United Nations, supra note 7. As President George W. Bush made
clear following the horrific suicide terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., and in Pennsylvania,
"the most basic commitment of civilization . . . [is that] [w]e will defend ourselves and our future against terror
and lawless violence." id.
19. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Nation (Sept. 7, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-l.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer). "[T]he war on terror ... [is] a lengthy war, a different kind of war, fought on
many fronts in many places," explained President Bush. "We have learned," he continued, "that terrorist attacks
are not caused by the use of strength; they are invited by the perception of weakness. And the surest way to
avoid attacks on our own people is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans." Id.
20. See, e.g., The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 7; see also NewsHour,
supra note 16.
21. See, e.g., Bruce Hoffman, Dealing with Asymmetric Threats, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, Annual
Meeting Jan. 24, 2003, at http://www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/Dealing%20with%
20Asymmetric%2OThreats_2003?open&country_id= (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
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Terrorists demonstrate brazen disregard for rules of international behavior and
accepted moral codes, while at the same time hiding behind these very rules and
moral codes to prevent the free world from protecting itself. Hence, one of the most
serious challenges facing the world today is the application of existing international
rules to the fight against terror. However, existing rules did not envisage situations
like an enemy using his or her body as a living bomb or a democratic state fighting
against a network of terrorist organizations and cells, intent on disrupting civilian
life. Clearly, this new reality requires interpretation and application of the existing
rules in an innovative and dynamic fashion to effectively confront this modern
phenomenon. "[N]ew threats," astutely observed President George W. Bush, "require
new thinking."22 Those fighting this new type of war must be given the legal tools
with which to do it, so as to enable them to conduct the fight against terrorism in a
manner that will allow them to carry out their mission successfully. Surely, the best
and possibly only way to successfully combat such terrorism is to seek out the
terrorists wherever they are and destroy their infrastructure before they wreak more
devastating havoc.23 Certainly, in this modern technological age, international law
cannot require a State to sit back and wait while unfathomable terror threats
crystallize and the risks and dangers materialize 24 portending inconceivable and
unimaginable consequences. 25 "[T]he war on terror will not be won on the
defensive," reasoned the President of the United States. "We must take the battle to
the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats 
before they emerge.,
26
Hence, it is necessary to engage in "preemptive action when necessary.
'27 As The
National Security Strategy of the United States of September 2002 expounds, "[t]he
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as
to the time and place of the enemy's attack."
28
22. Bush, Address at Graduation Exercise, supra note 11.
23. See, e.g., id.; NewsHour, supra note 16. "A terrorist can attack at any time at any place using a range of
techniques," explained U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. "It is physically impossible to defend at every
time in every location against every conceivable technique of terrorism. Therefore, if your goal is to stop it, you
cannot stop it by defense. You can only stop it by taking the battle to the terrorists, where they are and going after
them." Secretary Rumsfeld continued: "[Y]ou say to yourself, well, if we can't stop terrorists at every location of
every technique at every moment of the day or night, what must we do-Just sit here and take the blows like the
World Trade, take the blows that biological weapons would pose to us? The answer is no. You have a responsibility
to defend your country.... [T]he UN Charter provides-for the right of self-defense. And the only self-defense, the
only effective way to defend is to take the battle to where the terrorists are. They are planning, they are plotting,
they have trained thousands of terrorists very well, and we have no choice but to find those people and root them
out, as the president said, and stop them from doing what they're doing and stop countries from harboring them."
Id.
24. See The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 7. "[I]n an age where the enemies of
civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain
idle while dangers gather." Id.
25. See, e.g., Bush, State of the Union, supra note 9. "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will
have waited too long," remarked President George W. Bush. Bush, Address at Graduation Exercise, supra note 11.
26. Bush, Address at Graduation Exercise, supra note 11.
27. Id.; The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 7.
28. The National Security Strategy of the United States, supra note 7.
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The use of armed force in or against a State harboring, sheltering, supporting,
aiding or abetting terrorists, in response to tragedy and devastation perpetrated in
another State by terrorists employing either "conventional" means or
"unconventional" methods such as suicide attacks and/or nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons, raises far-reaching issues that transcend any particular
circumstance. One of the significant issues raised in this context is the legality of
the use of armed force by a State to counter terrorists directing their attacks
against its citizens from within the territory of another State. The use of the
territory of one State by armed groups as a base in which to organize and train,
and later from which to attack another State, has been an unremitting occurrence
in all parts of the world.
Accordingly, the following paradigm and accompanying analysis are
applicable to any situation in which a State supports, abets, aids, shelters, or
harbors, terrorists. This paradigm and accompanying analysis will help in
analyzing many terrorist incidents which have already occurred, or which could
occur anywhere at any future time.
II. THE OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES THAT ACT IN
COMPLICITY WITH TERRORISTS AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW UNDER
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
Every State is bound by Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter to refrain
"from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations."29 The goals of terrorists usually involve the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity of the target State. "The entry into or
presence in the territory of another state of ... self-organised armed bands
constitute.., a violation of the territorial integrity of that state," explained J. E.
S. Fawcett. "A state will be using such force in so far as it sends these... bands
across, or encourages or tolerates their crossing the frontier, or assists them
when they are already in the territory, of the other state."30 Thus, every State is
prohibited from sheltering and providing aid and support to terrorists, because
such assistance is exploited by the terrorists in furthering their threats and use of
force.
Consequently, if a State sanctions terrorist activity emanating from it against
another State and/or its citizens, and/or fails to prevent such terrorist activity, and/or
tolerates such terrorist activity, and/or does not eliminate this terrorist presence from
its territory, it will be unquestionably in violation of Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 748 of March
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, available at www.JN.org/aboutun/charter/ (last visited March, 24, 2004).
30. J. E. S. Fawcett, hitervention in International Law, A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 RECUEIL DES
COURS 343, 358-59 (1961-H1) (emphasis added).
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31, 1992, made this clear by explicitly linking a State's involvement with terrorism to
its obligations under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, when it imposed
diplomatic, arms and related material, and air sanctions on Libya for its continuing
involvement with terrorist activities and for its refusal to comply with requests to
fully cooperate in establishing responsibility for terrorist acts in 1988 against Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. It re-affirmed that, "in accordance with the
principle in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, every State
has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when such acts involve a
threat or use of force.. ,3, Ian Brownlie, some thirty years before Resolution 748,
aptly concluded:
An examination of the State practice in disputes arising out of State
complicity in, or toleration of the activities of armed bands directed
against other States shows conclusively that no State can now claim that
such behavior is lawful. The illegality may be expressed in terms of
charges of aggression, intervention, interference in internal affairs,
violation of territorial integrity and political independence, or a violation
of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter.32
Unquestionably, then, the use of indirect force is prohibited by Article 2(4).'3
III. THE OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES THAT ACT IN
COMPLICITY WITH TERRORISTS AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Responsibility of States to Ensure that Their Territory is not used for
Terrorist Acts
Every State is bound by customary international law concerning non-
intervention, which is premised "on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
[States]" as also reflected in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter.34 Every
State has the responsibility of insuring that its territory is not used as a base from
which to carry out acts that are injurious and hostile to other States.35 As held in
the Corfu Channel Case by the International Court of Justice, every State has an
31. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 3063rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RESf748 (1992) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
32. Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 712, 734
(1958) [hereinafter Brownlie, Activities ofArmed Bands] (emphasis added).
33. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in BRUNO SIMMA (ed.), I THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 112, 119-20 (2d ed. 2002)..
34. See, e.g., John C. Novogrod, Indirect Aggression, in I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 198, 214-15 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
35. See, e.g., id.
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"obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other States. 3 6 Traditionally, "each state was responsible for all activity
within its borders," explained W. Michael Reisman, "and if military action
emanated from its boundaries into the territory of another state, it remained liable
to that other state for the actual and constructive violations of the other's
sovereignty."" The concept of attributability to a State, then, applies if the State
was "reluctant to impede these acts. 38
B. States Must Actively Prevent Their Territory from Being Used for Terrorist
Acts
Beyond the responsibility of a State for all acts conducted within its territory
which violate the rights of another State as well as for any resulting violations of
the other State's sovereignty, it moreover must actively prevent such acts and
violations. As Judge John Moore explained in the S. S. Lotus Case, "[i]t is well
settled that a State is bound to use due diligence to prevent the commission within
its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or its people."39Clearly
then, according to Hans Kelsen, a State is obligated under international law to
prevent the commission on its territory of acts injurious to another State such as
"hostile expeditions organized in [its] territory. .. and directed against the
territorial integrity of... [the] foreign state .... "40 Consequently, concluded
Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, "there is little room for doubt where the
subversive activities of private persons in a state take the form of organising on
its territory armed hostile expeditions against another state... [a] state is bound
36. Corfu Channel Case (Gr. Brit. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. REPORTS 3, 22 (emphasis added); see ANN VAN
WYNEN THOMAS & A. J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 134
(1956).
37. W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1, 3 (1973) (emphasis added). For instance, as then-acting U.S. Secretary of State Kenneth Rush wrote
in 1974, "it is the established policy of the United States that a State is responsible for the international armed
force originating from its territory, whether that force be direct and overt or indirect and covert." Arthur W.
Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 720, 736
(1974) (citing Letter to Eugene Rostow of the Yale Law School from Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush
(May 29, 1974)) (emphasis added).
38. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in BRUNO SIMMA (ed.), I THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 788, 802 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Randelzhofer, Article 51].
39. S. S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Fr. v. Turk) (ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Sept. 7, 1927) (Moore, J., dissenting),
cited in II WORLD COURT REPORTS, A COLLECTION OF THE JUDGMENTS ORDERS AND OPINIONS OF THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1927-1932, at 65, 80 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1935) (emphasis
added). "[W]hat a State claims the right exclusively to control, such as its own territory," reasoned Charles C.
Hyde, "it must possess the power and accept the obligation to endeavor so to control as to prevent occurrences
therein from becoming by any process the immediate cause of such injury to a foreign State as the latter, in
consequence of the propriety of its own conduct, should not be subjected to at the hands of a neighbor."
CHARLES C. HYDE, I INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES
723 (2d rev. ed. 1947) (emphasis added).
40. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205-06 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. rev.
1966).
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not to allow its territory to be used for such hostile expeditions, and must
suppress and prevent them.
' 4
1
C. Conclusion of Customary International Law
Incontrovertibly, a State may neither organize, support, or host on its
territory terrorists directing their attacks against another State and is required to
guarantee that terrorists do not use its territory as a base for operations.
42 When a
State fails, whether as a result of carelessness or devise, to exercise due diligence
to prevent the carrying out of injurious acts against other States, its failure is
considered an offense under customary international law.
43 Moreover, the failure
to prevent such activities from taking place may result in the State being
considered as acting in complicity with the perpetrators of the activities illegal
under customary international law. Such "state tolerance," which "raises a
presumption of governmental complicity.. . amounts to an international
delinquency," reasoned Manuel R. Garcia-Mora."
IV. THE OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES THAT ACT IN
COMPLICITY WITH TERRORISTS AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
AND RESOLUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Rules of customary international law governing the obligation of a State to
ensure that terrorists do not use its territory as a base from which to direct attacks
against another State are reflected in multilateral conventions and in resolutions
of international organizations. Some seventy years ago, for instance, international
conventions already characterized the phrase "aggression by a State" as
comprising, among other things, the "[p]rovision of support to armed bands
41. I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 394 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996)
[hereinafter OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW] (emphasis added). "States are under a duty to prevent and
suppress such subversive activity against foreign Governments as assumes the form of armed hostile
expeditions or attempts to commit common crimes against life or property." L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A TREATISE 292-93 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM, I A TREATISE] (emphasis
added).
42. See, e.g., Novogrod, supra note 34, at 215.
43. See id.; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 36, at 217; Fawcett, supra note 30, at 356-57; OPPENHEIM,
I A TREATISE, supra note 41, at 365; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 41, at 549-50.
44. MANUEL R. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE ACTS OF PRIVATE
PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 51 (1962). Certainly in those instances in which a State actually
"encourages and even promotes the organization of [armed groups and] ... provides them with financial
assistance, training, and weapons" these groups may be considered "de facto organs" of the State. "When such
groups carry out the activities planned, those activities are attributed to the State and constitute internationally
wrongful acts of the State .... " Roberto Ago, Fourth report on State responsibility, A/CN.4/264 and Add. 1, II
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1972, at 71, 120 (1974) (emphasis supplied). Whenever individuals or groups do in deed
in fact act on behalf of a State, their conduct is attributed to that State and is "considered as an act of the State
under international law .. " Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-sixth
session, A/9610/Rev.1, 11(1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1974, at 157, 277 (1975).
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formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or
refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own
territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or
protection.4 5 Likewise, on December 10, 1934, the Council of the League of
Nations adopted a resolution that reiterated the same basic tenants of customary
international law, specifically that a State is responsible to ensure that its territory
is not used for terrorist acts against other States and that a State must furthermore
actively prevent its territory from being used for such terrorist acts. Article II of
the resolution stipulated that "it is the duty of every State neither to encourage
nor tolerate on its territory any terrorist activity with a political purpose, [and]
every State must do all in its power to prevent and repress acts of this nature and
must for this purpose lend its assistance to Governments which request it. 46 The
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism of 1937, also
reaffirmed "the principle of international law in virtue of which it is the duty of
every State to refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist activities
directed against another State and to prevent the acts in which such activities take
shape ....
In similar fashion, enumerated among the offenses in Article 2(4) of the
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1954, are
the following:
The organization, or the encouragement of the organization, by the
authorities of a State, of armed bands within its territory or any other
territory for incursions into the territory of another State, or the toleration
of the organization of such bands in its own territory, or the toleration of
the use by such armed bands of its territory as a base of operations or as
a point of departure for incursions into the territory of another State, as
well as direct participation in or support of such incursions.8
45. See, e.g., VI INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, A COLLECTION OF THE TEXTS OF MULTIPARTITE
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF GENERAL INTEREST: 1932-1934, at 413, 418 (Manley 0. Hudson, ed., 1937)
(citing various conventions defining aggression that contain this language). Garcia-Mora, writing in 1962, also
concisely articulated "[tihe general conviction ... that support to, and toleration of, armed bands likely to make
incursions into foreign territory engage the international responsibility of the state amounting to an act of
aggression." GARCIA-MORA, supra note 44, at 114 (emphasis added). Quincy Wright, as well, believed that
"failure of a government to prevent armed bands or insurgents from organizing within its territory to engage in
hostilities across a frontier, will make it responsible for aggression, if such hostilities actually occur." Quincy
Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 514, 527 (1956) (emphasis added).
46. LEAGUE OF NATIONS Doc. C. 543. 1934.VH, art II, 15 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. (No. 12, Part II)
1759, 1760 (1934) (emphasis added).
47. ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER, I TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL
253 (1979); VII INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, A COLLECTION OF THE TEXTS OF MULTIPARTITE
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF GENERAL INTEREST: 1935-1937, at 862, 865 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1941)
(citing CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF TERRORISM, art. l(l) (1937)) (emphasis
added).
48. INT'L LAW COMMISSION, supra note 5, art. 2(4) (emphasis added). A 1996 draft version of the Code
does not contain this clause. See id.
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Moreover, Article 2(6) of the Draft Code of 1954 includes as an offense against
the peace and security of mankind "[t]he undertaking or encouragement by the
authorities of a State of terrorist activities in another State, or the toleration by
the authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist
acts in another State. 49
In its Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty of
December 21, 1965, the United Nations General Assembly also condemned the
toleration by a State of terrorist or armed activity on its territory aimed against
another State, stipulating that "no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance,
incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the
violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in
another State. 5 °
On October 24, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly, in its Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, forbade even
the acquiescence of a State in organized activities in its territory directed at
committing acts of terrorism in another State: "Every State has the duty to refrain
from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed
bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State."5 '
Moreover, "[e]very State has a duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to... involve a threat or use of
force. 52
Furthermore, in Article 3(g) of the United Nations General Assembly's
Definition of Aggression, adopted on December 14, 1974, among the acts
considered aggression is included "[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts [of
aggression] listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.5 3 Certainly, the
49. id. art. 2(6) (emphasis added). This clause does not appear in the 1996 draft version of the Code. See
id.
50. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U. N. GAOR 1st Comm., 20th Sess., 1408th
plen. mtg., at 12 (1965) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/20/ares20.htm
(last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
5 1. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U. N. GAOR 6th Comm., 25th Sess.,
1883rd plen. mtg., at 123 (1970) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/ documents/ ga/res/25/ares25.htm
(last visited Sept. 30,2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th plen. mtg., art. 3(g)
(1974) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/29/ares29.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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last portion of this designation, "or its substantial involvement therein," may
comprise "involvement in the sending of armed bands by or on behalf of a State,"
as Julius Stone rightly indicated, even though the delinquent State may not in
point of fact be the one that is launching the bands attacking the target State.
54
Many more examples of resolutions of international organizations abound that
reflect the rules of customary international law that require a State to ensure that its
territory is not used by terrorists as a base from which to direct attacks against
another State. For instance, on December 9, 1985, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution 40/61 that unequivocally condemned "as criminal, all
acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed' and
thereupon called upon all States "to fulfil their obligations under international law to
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in
other States, or acquiescing in activities within their territory directed towards the
commission of such acts....
Further, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 42/22 on
November 18, 1987, that solemnly declared that "States shall fulfil their
obligations under international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, or
assisting or participating in paramilitary, terrorist or subversive acts, including
acts of mercenaries, in other States, or acquiescing in organized activities within
their territory directed towards the commission of such acts.,
56
As earlier mentioned in a slightly different context, on March 31, 1992,
United Nations Security Council Resolution 748 imposed diplomatic, arms and
related material, and air sanctions on Libya for its ongoing connection with
terrorist activities and for its rejection to abide by requests to fully assist in
establishing responsibility for 1988 terrorist acts perpetrated against a Pan Am
flight while over Scotland. The Security Council resolution re-affirmed that "in
accordance with the principle in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the
United Nations, every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such
acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of force .... ,"7
On December 9, 1994, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
Resolution 49/60, which approved the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism that reaffirmed the "unequivocal condemnation of all
acts, methods and practices of terrorism, as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever
and by whomever committed, including those which ... threaten the territorial
54. JULIUS STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS: UNITED NATIONS APPROACHES TO AGGRESSION
74(1977).
55. G.A. Res. 40/61, 108th plen. mtg. (1985) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/40/a40r061 .htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
56. G.A. Res. 42/22, 73rd plen. mtg. (1987) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/42/a42r022.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
57. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 31 (emphasis added).
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integrity and security of States . ... This Declaration further stipulated that
"States, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and other relevant rules of international law, must refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in territories of
other States, or from acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their
territories directed towards the commission of such acts ... .59 Also in
accordance with the Declaration:
States must... fulfil their obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations and other provisions of international law with respect to combating
international terrorism and are urged to take effective and resolute measures
in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law and
international standards of human rights for the speedy and final elimination
of international terrorism, in particular... [t]o refrain from organizing,
instigating, facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist
activities and to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that their
respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or training
camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be
committed against other States or their citizens .... 60
Along the same line, on December 17, 1996, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution 51/210. This resolution approved the Declaration to
Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,
which reaffirmed the "unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices
of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed,
including those which... threaten the territorial integrity and security of States
.... ,,6, General Assembly Resolution 51/210 also reiterated the "call upon States to
refrain from financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting
terrorist activities ....
On August 13, 1998, the United Nations Security Council, in Resolution
1189, condemned such acts as the "indiscriminate and outrageous acts of
international terrorism" on August 7, 1998, against the United States' embassies
in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, that "claimed hundreds of
innocent lives, injured thousands of people and caused massive destruction to
58. Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, 84th plen. mtg.,
art. 1 (1994) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/ 49/a49r060.htm (last visited
Sept. 30, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,
G.A. Res. 51/210, 88th plen. mtg., art. 1 (1996) (emphasis added), available at http://www. un.org/documents/
ga/res/5 1/a5 I r2 10.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
62. G. A. Res. 51/210, 88th plen. mtg., art. 5 (1996) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.
org/documents/ga/res/5 l/a51 r210.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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property." The resolution stressed that "every Member State has the duty to
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts ....63
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, adopted on October 15, 1999,
strongly condemned "the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas
controlled by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and planning of
terrorist acts... ."6 It deplored the fact that Afghanistan's Taliban authorities
continued "to provide safe haven" to Osama bin Laden and allowed "him and others
associated with him to operate a network of terrorist training camps from Taliban-
controlled territory and to use Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor
international terrorist operations... .65 The resolution further insisted that
Afghanistan's Taliban authorities "cease the provision of sanctuary and training for
international terrorists and their organizations" and "take appropriate effective
measures to ensure that the territory under [Taliban] control is not used for terrorist
installations and camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts
against other States or their citizens ....
On October 19, 1999, Resolution 1269 of the United Nations Security
Council expressed deep concern for "the increase in acts of international
terrorism which endangers the lives and well-being of individuals worldwide as
well as the peace and security of all States. 67 It explicitly condemned "all acts of
terrorism, irrespective of motive, wherever and by whomever committed.,
68
Furthermore, it unequivocally condemned "all acts, methods and practices of
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their
forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, in particular
those which could threaten international peace and security," and called "upon all
States to take ... appropriate steps to ... prevent and suppress in their territories
through all lawful means the preparation and financing of any acts of terrorism
[and] deny those who plan, finance or commit terrorist acts safe havens by
ensuring their apprehension and prosecution or extradition .... ,69
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 of December 19, 2000,
strongly condemned "the continuing use of the areas of Afghanistan under the
control of ... the Taliban... for the sheltering and training of terrorists and
63. S.C. Res. 1189, 3915th mtg. (1998) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/
scres/1998/scres98.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
64. S.C. Res. 1267, 4051st mtg. (1999) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/scres/
1999/sc99.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. S.C. Res. 1269, 4053d mtg. (1999), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/committees/1373/Sres
1269(1999).htm (last visited Mar.24, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. id. (emphasis added).
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planning of terrorist acts., 70 It deplored the fact that Afghanistan's Taliban
authorities continued "to provide safe haven" to Osama bin Laden and allowed
"him and others associated with him to operate a network of terrorist training
camps from Taliban-controlled territory and to use Afghanistan as a base from
which to sponsor international terrorist operations.'', Resolution 1333
demanded that Afghanistan's Taliban authorities "cease the provision of
sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations.,72 It
also instructed Afghanistan to "take appropriate effective measures to ensure that
the territory under [Taliban] control is not used for terrorist installations and
camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts against other
States or their citizens," and further demanded that Afghanistan's Taliban
authorities "act swiftly to close all camps where terrorists are trained within the
territory under [Taliban] control ....
More recently, the United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 1368,
adopted on September 12, 2001, unequivocally condemned "in the strongest
terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in
New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania. 74 The resolution stressed "that
those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators,
organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable... . The
Security Council also "[d]etermined to combat by all means threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts," recognized "the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the
Charter," and regarded "such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a
threat to international peace and security ....
On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed in
Resolution 1373 that such acts as "the terrorist attacks which took place in New
York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001 ... like any act
of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security
"177.... It further reaffirmed "the principle.., that every State has the duty to
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts., 78 The resolution also stipulated that States
70. S.C. Res. 1333, 4251st mtg. (2000) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/
scres/2000/sc2000.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. S.C. Res. 1368, 4370th mtg. (2001), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/scres/2001/sc200l.htm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. S.C. Res. 1373, 4385th mtg. (2001), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/ scres/2001/sc200l.htm
(last visited Oct. I, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
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shall "[r]efrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities
or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of
members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to
terrorists." 7 9 It instructed States to "[tlake the necessary steps to prevent the
commission of terrorist acts" and "[d]eny safe haven to those who finance, plan,
support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens."' 0 The Security Council
further directed States to "[p] revent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit
terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against
other States or their citizens . . . ."" The resolution reaffirmed as well "the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the
Charter of the United Nations" in addition to "the need to combat by all means,
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international
peace and security caused by terrorist acts. 82
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1378, adopted on November 14,
2001, condemned "the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for
the export of terrorism by the Al-Qaida network and other terrorist groups and
for providing safe haven to Usama bin Laden, A1-Qaida and others associated
with them ....
V. CONCLUSION OF THE OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES THAT
ACT IN COMPLICITY WITH TERRORISTS AND TERROR ORGANIZATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
In accordance with the law under the United Nations Charter, with customary
international law, with international conventions, as well as with numerous
resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United
Nations, a State is categorically responsible for all acts carried out within its
territory which are contrary to the rights of other States, and is liable for any
resulting violations of the sovereignty of another State. Furthermore, the
delinquent State must actively prevent such acts and violations. Hence, the failure
by a State to prevent attacks by terrorists against the target State constitutes a
violation of the rights of the target State.84 Moreover, if a State does nothing to
stop terrorist actions aimed at the target State, its inaction in and of itself
constitutes complicity in the acts of terrorism: "[G]overnmental inactivity in
preventing the organization of a military expedition amounts to complicity in the
hostile attack and can logically be regarded as actual governmental participation
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. S.C. Res. 1378, 4415th mtg. (2001) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/
Docs/scres/2001/sc2001 .htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
84. See GARCIA-MORA, supra note 44, at 51.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 17
in the conflict," explained Garcia-Mora. 5 Even "if a state has obviously used all
the means at its disposal to prevent a hostile act of a person against a foreign
nation but is physically unable to suppress it, it certainly has not discharged its
international duty. ' 6 The international obligations of a State flow from its
sovereign status, and its responsibilities as a State are unrelated to its ability to
control the carrying out of acts which emanate from its territory and which are
injurious to others beyond its borders. Accordingly, any claimed inability to
control the terrorists may not relieve a State of its international obligation to curb
use of its soil by terrorists to launch activities against other States. s7 Examined in
this fashion, a State's failure to prevent assaults by terrorists against another State
constitutes a violation of the rights of the other State.8"
VI. THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST TERRORISTS AND STATES THAT AID
AND ABET THEM AND SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: "ARMED
ArACK" AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND
THEIR APPLICATION TO TERRORISM
When a State is unwilling, or unable, to prevent terrorists from using its
territory as a base from which to attack another State, the State thereby attacked
is permitted to exercise force to protect itself pursuant to its inherent right of self-
defense. The operative section of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
stipulates that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security ... ."
Attacks against one State by terrorists emanating from the territory of another
State certainly constitute "an armed attack" and are deemed perpetrated not only
by the terrorists and their organizations themselves, but also by the State from
which they are operating. As far as the attacks perpetrated by the terrorists
themselves, J. E. S. Fawcett explained that "the intrusion of armed bands may...
constitute an armed attack for purposes of Article 51 of the Charter., 89 Nothing
contained in the United Nations Charter specifies that "an armed attack" may
85. Id. (emphasis added). After all, "when a state is under a legal duty to act or under a legal duty not to
act and it breaches that duty with knowledge that the consequences of that breach of duty will interfere in the
affairs of another state by altering or maintaining the condition of things without its consent, the state which
breached its duty intends the consequences just as truly as it intended to do or to omit the thing done. And in
intending the consequences, it has thereby imposed its will upon another state. In such a case actual intent to
alter or maintain the condition of things or to compel action or inaction becomes unimportant; intervention
occurs, so that interference comes close to being synonymous with intervention." THOMAS AND THOMAS, supra
note 36, at 73.
86. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 44, at 30 (emphasis added).
87. Cf Barry Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal
Under Modern International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 12 (1982).
88. Cf id. at 45-46.
89. Fawcett, supra note 30, at 388 (emphasis added).
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only be perpetrated by a State, and Article 51 was drafted in a broad enough
manner to permit the use of force in self-defense to counter non-state actors. 90
Thus, "[i]t is accepted today that attacks of private terrorist groups may qualify
as 'armed attacks,' 9' concluded Carsten Stahn.
In regard to the State from which the terrorist attacks originated, it too
definitely may be considered to have committed "an armed attack." "[T]he
undertaking or encouragement by a state of terrorist activities in another state or
the toleration by a state of organized activities calculated to result in terrorist
acts in another state," indicated Hans Kelsen, "may be interpreted as constituting
an armed attack .... ,92 Ian Brownlie as well, made clear that "it is conceivable
that a coordinated and general campaign by powerful bands of irregulars, with
obvious or easily proven complicity of the government of a state from which they
operate, would constitute an 'armed attack'."' The toleration or encouragement
by a State of the organization of hostile expeditions on its territory aimed against
another State is at the very least a "constructive attack" by the State in which
these preparations occur, and as a consequence, "it becomes responsible for the
illicit acts which it has failed to prevent," summarized Ellery C. Stowell. 94
"[F]or the attribution to a State of acts of... groups" such as armed bands of
irregulars or rebels, according to the judgment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, "it is
sufficient to require that the group as a whole be under the overall control of the
State. 95 The test enunciated in the International Court of Justice Case concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, and subsequently
rejected by the International Criminal Tribunal, was that in order to find a State
legally accountable for the actions of armed groups, evidence was needed that the
90. See Carsten Stahn, "Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua "-The Right to Self-Defense under Art.
51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 24, Conference "Terrorism as a Challenge for National and
International Law," Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available
at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer).
91. Id.at33.
92. KELSEN, supra note 40, at 62-63 (emphasis added).
93. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 279 (1963); Brownlie,
Activities of Armed Bands, supra note 32, at 731 (emphasis added).
94. ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES IN CONFORMITY WITH
ACTUAL PRACTICE 89-91 (1931).
95. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, JUDGEMENT (1999), INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 120, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 16, 2003) (emphasis added). "This kind of State control over a military group and the fact that the State is held
responsible for acts performed by a group independently of any State instructions, or even contrary to instructions,
to some extent equates the group with State organs proper." Id. 121. "Under the rules of State responsibility, as
restated in Article 10 of the Draft on State Responsibility as provisionally adopted by the International Law
Commission, a State... incurs responsibility even for acts committed by its officials outside their remit or contrary
to its behest. The rationale behind this provision is that a State must be held accountable for acts of its organs
whether or not these organs complied with instructions, if any, from the higher authorities." Id. 121.
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State "directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts" in question." In other
words, it would "have to be proved that that State had effective control of the
military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations
were committed." 97 In Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found that if an organized group "is under
the overall control of a State, it must perforce engage the responsibility of that
State for its activities, whether or not each of them was specifically imposed,
requested or directed by the State.""g The Tribunal ruled that "international law
renders any State responsible for acts in breach of international law
performed.., by individuals who make up organised groups subject to the
State's control ... regardless of whether or not the State has issued specific
instructions to those individuals."99 "The 'effective control' test propounded by
the International Court of Justice as an exclusive and all-embracing test is at
variance with international judicial and State practice: such practice has
envisaged State responsibility in circumstances where a lower degree of control
than that demanded by the Nicaragua test was exercised," explained the
International Criminal Tribunal.' °° "In cases dealing with members of military or
paramilitary groups," the Tribunal elaborated, "courts have clearly departed
from the notion of 'effective control' set out by the International Court of Justice
(i.e., control that extends to the issuance of specific instructions concerning the
various activities of the individuals in question)."'' Indubitably then, as the
Criminal Tribunal held:
Under international law it is by no means necessary that the controlling
authorities should plan all the operations of the units dependent on them,
choose their targets, or give specific instructions concerning the conduct
of military operations and any alleged violations of international
96. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 64, available at http://www. icj-cij.org/icjwww/Icases/iNus/inusframe.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2003) [hereinafter "the Nicaragua case"]. With its ruling, the International Criminal Tribunal held that the
International Court of Justice's "effective control" test articulated in the Nicaragua case was not "persuasive."
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 95, 115.
97. The Nicaragua case, supra note 96, at 65.
98. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 95, T 122 (emphasis supplied).
99. Id. 123 (emphasis supplied)..
100. Id. T 124.
101. Id. T 125 (emphasis supplied). "In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a
State, it must be proved that the State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and
financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity. Only
then can the State be held internationally accountable for any misconduct of the group. However, it is not
necessary that, in addition, the State should also issue, either to the head or to members of the group,
instructions for the commission of specific acts contrary to international law." Id. 9 131. "[C]ontrol by a State
over subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary units may be of an overall character (and must
comprise more than the mere provision of financial assistance or military equipment or training). This
requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction
of each individual operation." Id. T 137 (emphasis supplied).
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humanitarian law. The control required by international law may be
deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the
Party to the conflict) has a role in organising,, coordinating or planning
the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing,
training and equipping or providing operational support to that group.
Acts performed by the group or members thereof may be regarded as acts
of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by the
controlling State concerning the commission of each of those acts. '0 2
Thus, since the International Court of Justice's "effective control" test from the
Nicaragua decision
does not adequately address new forms of terrorism, emerging from
largely independent private actors ... [a] viable and reasonable alternative
to [this test] is, in particular, the "overall control test" adopted by the
[International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor
v. Dusko Tadic], which relieves the defending state from the (unrealistic)
obligation to provide evidence about specific instructions or directions of
the host state relating to the terrorist act, triggering the right to self-
defence.'03
"[W]hat is required for criminal responsibility to arise is some measure of
control by a Party to the conflict over the perpetrators. ' °4 Besides, "[a]ny
suggestion that there are any acts of unlawful force between states that
international law forbids a state from defending against by proportionate force,
102. Id. T 137 (emphasis supplied). It bears mention that the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in
Nicaragua did not believe that an "armed attack" could include "assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of
weapons or logistical or other support..." notwithstanding the fact that "[s]uch assistance may be regarded as a
threat to or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States." The Nicaragua
case, supra note 96, at 104; see id. at 119. That having been said, "[taking into consideration modem practice of
international terrorism... the statement of the ICJ is much too sweeping," wrote Albrecht Randelzhofer, "... .and
needs further differentiation. Otherwise, it would lead to the result that States were not sufficiently protected by Art.
51 of the Charter, against force committed by other States in an individual manner, thus eroding the very purpose of
this rule. If, for example, a State knows that a private group is willing to commit acts of military force against
another State and [it] places its territory at the disposal of this group to train its members and to offer them a safe
haven after they have committed these acts and additionally provides them with weapons and logistical support, it
is hardly to be understood why this should be a lesser participation in the acts of the group than the mere sending of
it. It is not adequate to exclude generally certain types of supporting terrorism from being qualified as 'substantial
involvement' and consequently 'armed attack'." Randelzhofer, Article 51, supra note 38, at 801. In other words, as
Judge Sir Robert Jennings observed in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case, "to say that the provision of
arms, coupled with 'logistical or other support' is not armed attack is going much too far." Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Sir Robert Jennings, the Nicaragua case, supra note 96, at 528, 543 available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/Icases/iNus/inusframe.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer). Furthermore, Judge Stephen Schwebel in his dissent in the Nicaragua case rejects the "construction of the
United Nations Charter which would read Article 51 as if it were worded. . .'if, and only if, an armed attack
occurs...' Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, the Nicaragua case, supra note 96, at 259, 347 (last visited
Oct. 16, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
103. Stahn, supra note 90, at 41.
104. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 95, 96.
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by the means and to the extent reasonably necessary to protect itself, degrades the
concept of international law, and diminishes the inducement for a responsible
political leader to take its constraints seriously into account in conflict situations
in the actual planning and conduct of that state's affairs."' 5
Moreover, deduced Carsten Stahn, "there may be cases in which [an
accumulation] of several acts of support to a terrorist group causes much greater
harm to the defending state than the mere sending of it. To exclude these cases
from the scope of application of Art. 51 would deprive states of their protection
against indirect aggression."' 6
Further, it should be pointed out that while Article 51 does not specifically
indicate the way in which "an armed attack occurs,"'' 7 it could not be logically
contended, for example, that using airplanes loaded with fuel to crash into
buildings on September 11 th was anything but "an armed attack" under Article
51; at the very least, their damage capability was far greater than many military
weapons purposely calculated to bring about vast loss of life and enormous
property devastation. Certainly the consequences of the suicide attacks were
tantamount to those of a military operation. Moreover, even where an attack
takes place against citizens of the target State who were at the time located
abroad, Article 51 would still be applicable. 0 8 Likewise, the scale of the attack,
whether large or small, is irrelevant to it being considered "an armed attack:"' 9
"[T]he plain language of Article 51 ... in no way limits itself to especially large,
direct or important armed attacks," explained John L. Hargrove." ° Therefore,
"[i]f 'armed attack' means illegal armed attack it means, on the other hand, any
105. John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-
Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 139 (1987).
106. Stahn, supra note 90, at 49 (emphasis supplied).
107. See Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51
of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. OFINT'L L. 25, 42 (1987).
108. See, e.g., Stahn, supra note 90, at 33; see also Antonio Cassese, The International Community's
"Legal" Response to Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q., 589, 596 (1989); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 197 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, WAR]. "[A]n armed attack can be
perpetrated against a State's nationals abroad. The act would be tantamount to an armed attack against the State
itself, if the nationals are attacked deliberately because of the specific bound of nationality .... If so, the attack
against those nationals constitutes an armed attack ... under Article 51." Yoram Dinstein, Comment,
Conference "Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law," Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law 4 (Jan. 2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-
terrorism/presentation.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Dinstein, Comment].
109. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 108, at 192; Dinstein, Comment, supra note 108, at 4. In spite
of the International Court of Justice's finding in the Nicaragua case that it was "necessary to distinguish the
most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms" [the
Nicaragua case, supra note 96, at 101.1, "in reality, there is no cause to remove small-scale armed attacks from
the spectrum of armed attacks." DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 108, at 192.
110. Hargrove, supra note 105, at 139. "The Charter does not specify the means by which an armed
attack must occur, nor does it set a minimum level of attack which must be surpassed. Terrorist acts carried out
by armed bands with the support or encouragement of a foreign state is (sic), in a literal sense, an armed attack."
Baker, supra note 107, at 42. But see id.
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illegal armed attack, even a small border incident," wrote Josef L. Kunz."'
Certainly, then, "[s]maller terrorist attacks which form part of a consistent pattern
of violent terrorist action may constitute an armed attack....
In decisive fashion, previously mentioned United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1368, adopted on September 12, 2001, specifically recognized "the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the
Charter" in light of "the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11
September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania." The
Security Council in this resolution also regarded "such acts, like any act of
international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security, [and
stressed] that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable."' 3
The Security Council also determined "to combat by all means threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts .. '""' Some two weeks
later, the United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 1373 of September 28,
2001, reaffirmed "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations" in view of "the terrorist attacks
which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11
September 2001, . . . [that] like any act of international terrorism, constitute a
threat to international peace and security . . . ." The resolution further reaffirmed
"the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts" as
well as "the principle established ... that every State has the duty to refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards
the commission of such acts ....
Consequently, while it is incontrovertible that the activities of terrorists
against a target State and its citizens would in and of themselves constitute "an
armed attack," within even the most restrictive reading of United Nations Charter
Article 51, the actions, or inactions, of States that aid and abet terrorists may also
constitute "an armed attack" within the narrow meaning of the article. Thus,
concluded J. E. S. Fawcett:
[W]here incursion of armed bands is a precursor to an armed attack, or
itself constitutes an attack, and the authorities in the territory, from which
111. Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, 41 AM.J.INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947).
112. Stahn, supra note 90, at 38; cf Baker, supra note 107, at 43. But see Cassese, supra note 108, at
596; Randelzhofer, Article 51, supra note 38, at 802; James P. Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism:
Substantive and Procedural Constraints in International Law, 81 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 307, 314 (1987).
113. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 74 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 77 (emphasis added).
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the armed bands came, are either unable or unwilling to control and
restrain them then armed intervention, having as its sole object the
removal or destruction of their bases, would-it is believed-be
justifiable under Article 51."6
Furthermore, as Albrecht Randelzhofer aptly pointed out, even "if a State
gives shelter to terrorists after they have committed an act of terrorism within
another State," the "terrorist acts ... [amounting] to an armed attack. . . are
attributable to [it]. . . .""' Hence, although a State may not have been used as a
staging base for the terrorists, but rather, that State gave sanctuary to terrorists
who had perpetrated an attack, "the defending state would also be entitled to take
military measures against [it].... Why should a terrorist actor, who simply
changes jurisdiction, benefit from the 'shield of sovereignty' of another host state
which fails to fulfil its duty to suppress terrorist activities emanating from its
soil?"" 1 8 As Albrecht Randelzhofer correctly concluded, even if a State were
"incapable of impeding acts of terrorism committed by making use of its
territory... the State victim of the acts is not precluded from reacting by military
means against the terrorists within the territory of the other State. Otherwise, a
so-called failed State would turn out to be a safe haven for terrorists, certainly not
what [Articles] 2(4) and 51 of the Charter are aiming at."" 9
VII. THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST TERRORISTS AND STATES THAT
AID AND ABET THEM AND SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE AND ITS APPLICATION
TO TERRORISM
Under customary international law, the right of self-defense has always been
"anticipatory" and could be exercised against dangers and attacks that are
imminent as well as actual. 20 As Ellery C. Stowell explained, "[a] state
may ... defend itself, by preventive means if ... necessary, against attack by
another state, threat of attack, or preparations or other conduct from which an
intention to attack may reasonably be apprehended."'2 Consequently, wrote C.
116. Fawcett, supra note 39, at 363 (emphasis added); see also Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General
Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 5,
173 (1957-11); Edward Miller, Self-Defence, International Law and the Six-Day War, 20 ISRAEL L.R. 49, 57-58
(1985); Barry Feinstein, Self-Defence and Israel in International Law: A Reappraisal, 11 ISRAEL. L.R. 516,
539-40 (1976); Barry A. Feinstein, The.Legality of the Use of Armed Force by Israel in Lebanon-June 1982,
20 ISRAEL L. REV. 362 (1985), reprinted in TERRORISM 93, 117 (Conor Gearty ed., 1996) (a title in the series
THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF CRIMINOLOGY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PENOLOGY (Gerald Mars & David
Nelken eds.)).
117. Randelzhofer, Article 51, supra note 38, at 802 (emphasis added).
118. Stahn, supra note 90, at 44.
119. Randelzhofer, Article 51, supra note38, at 802.
120. See D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-89 (1958).
121. STOWELL, supra note 94, at 113-14 (emphasis added).
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H. M. Waldock, the inherent right of self-defense may be exercised against an
imminent threat of armed attack. '22
The language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter itself preserves
"the inherent right of ... self-defence:" "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security
.... ,,123 To adopt an unrealistic approach to Article 51 of the Charter, an
approach that does not comport with reality, would be irreconcilable with the
reasonable interests of States, since circumstances "may arise prior to an actual
attack and call for self-defence immediately if it is to be of any avail at all,"
explained Derek W. Bowett. 124 Besides, "[i]t is hardly likely that those who
drafted Article 51," elucidated D. W. Greig, "would have been prepared to
disregard the lessons of recent history and to insist that a state should wait for the
aggressor's blow to fall before taking positive measures for its own protection.
There is no need to read Article 51 in such a way, and it would be totally
unrealistic to do so. ''125 Thus, Article 51 did not restrict the traditional right of a
State to respond in self-defense in a manner that would exclude the right to take
action against an imminent danger that had not yet taken the form of an actual
"armed attack."'' 26 Therefore, as Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts pointed out, if
an appeal by the target State to the host State to remove a danger, presented by
armed groups being formed on the territory of the host State for the purpose of a
raid into the target State, were "fruitless or not possible, or if there is danger in
delay, a case of necessity arises," which permits the threatened State to enter the
host State and eradicate the "intending raiders.' 27
122. See C. H. M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 451, 500-01 (1952-I1).
123. U.N. CHARTER art. 51, available at www.UN.org/aboutun/charter/ (last visited March, 24, 2004).
124. BOWETr, supra note 120, at 191.
125. D. W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 682 (1970).
126. " BoWETT, supra note 120, at 191.
127. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 41, at 421; see OPPENHEIM, I A TREATISE, supra
note 41, at 298. A State is definitely allowed to employ measures of force in anticipatory self-defense if, as
Rosalyn Higgins pointed out, it "has been subjected, over a period of time, to border raids by nationals of
another state, which are openly supported by the government of that state; to threats of a future, and possibly
imminent, large-scale attack, and to the harassments of alleged belligerent rights." ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
201(1963); see also Yehuda Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 JAHRBUCH FUR INTERNATIONALES
RECHT 223, 234 (1976). By analogy, the international law of neutrality may be of help to analyze the
obligations of a State that has failed to stop the perpetration of injurious acts emanating from its territory against
other States. See Hersch Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States, 22
AM. J. INT'L L. 105, 127 (1928); Brownlie, Activities of Armed Bands, supra note 32, at 723; GARCIA-MORA,
supra note 44, at 50. "[l]t is well established in customary international law," wrote John N. Moore, "that a
belligerent Power may take action to end serious violations of neutral territory by an opposing belligerent when
the neutral Power is unable to prevent belligerent use of its territory and when the action is necessary and
proportional to lawful defensive objectives." John Norton Moore, Legal Dimensions of the Decision to
Intercede in Cambodia, in III THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE WIDENING CONTEXT 58, 71
(Richard Falk ed., 1972) [hereinafter Falk, THE WIDENING CONTEXT]; see also John C. Bender, Self-Defense
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The principle is simple, according to Carsten Stahn. "The defending state is...
under a duty to resort initially to diplomatic means in requesting the government in
whose territory the terrorist acts have been planned or trained to take suppressive
measures. If it becomes evident that the host state is unable or unwilling to act, the
injured may, as an ultima ratio measure, take military action to stop the persisting
threat.'
28
The "necessity," which would thus comprise a "necessity for the purpose of
self-defense," has been characterized as "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."'
29
Accordingly, if a State does not, or cannot control the inhabitants in the
territory over which it is sovereign, or police its borders, and if the target State is
faced with an imminent danger as a direct consequence of this unwillingness or
incapacity, the target State is justified in engaging in its own efforts to quell the
threatened hostile actions from within the abetting State'3° when peaceful
attempts to eliminate the danger to the target State are to no avail. In
circumstances such as these, a "case of necessity" will consequently have arisen
leaving the target State no choice but to exercise its legitimate right of self-
defense by entering the abetting State to subdue the terrorists and destroy the
terrorist bases and apparatus poised against the target State.' A "strong
probability of armed attack," that is, "an imminent threat of armed attack," is
therefore sufficient to trigger a State's right to self-defense.'32 Thus, in addition to
the legitimate exercise of self-defense directed against an actual "armed attack"
of terrorists, anticipatory action, aimed at preventing serious injury, may also be
taken against the abetting State. In any case, according to Peter Rowe, "[i]t may
be that ... the only realistic options available to a state to deal with [the] 'new
breed of apocalyptic terrorist"' are approaches that "involve a state using military
force to bring terrorists 'to justice."""
and Cambodia: A Critical Appraisal, in Falk, THE WIDENING CONTEXT, supra, at 138, 146. As Myres S.
McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano explained, "[w]here a non-participant is unable or unwilling to prevent
one belligerent from carrying on hostile activities within neutral territory, or from utilizing such territory as a
'base of operations,' the opposing belligerent, seriously disadvantaged by neutral failure or weakness, becomes
authorized to enter neutral territory and there to take the necessary measures to counter and stop the hostile
activities." MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 568 (1961); see, e.g., Note, International Law and
Military Operations against Insurgents in Neutral Territory, 68 COLUM. L.R. 1127, 1129 (1968).
128. Stahn, supra note 90, at 42; see Roberto Ago, Addendum to the eighth report on State
responsibility, A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, 11(1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1980, at 13, 69 (1982) [hereinafter Ago,
eighth report].
129. This criterion appears in former U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster's August 6, 1842
communiqu6 to British official representative Lord Ashburton regarding the Caroline incident, ascited in JOHN
B. MOORE, II A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906).
130. Cf MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 220 (1977); STONE, supra note 51, at 79.
131. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 41, at 42; OPPENHEIM, I A TREATISE, at 298.
132. Waldock, supra note 122, at 500; BowETT, supra note 120, at 189.
133. Peter Rowe, Responses to Terror: The New 'War', 3 MELB. J INT'L LAW 321 (2002), available at
www.law.unimelb.edu.au/mjil/issues/archivel2002(2)/O4Rowe.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).
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Furthermore, and even more far-reaching in specific reference to terrorism as
such, according to Rainer Grote, is that "the right to intervention against terrorist
groups does not only apply in situations where the threat is imminent, but also in
those cases where the danger is more remote but nevertheless real. This wide
interpretation of the time limits for intervention corresponds to the specific nature
of terrorism, which does not manifest itself in sustained operations, but rather in
intermittent acts of violence the times and places of which are difficult, if not
impossible to predict. In practice, this allows states to strike at terrorist groups
independent of any imminent threat in the narrow sense.., where a terrorist
group has already demonstrated by past acts its capacity to wreak havoc upon
foreign nations....
Yet, there still remains the important issue as to how to determine whether or
not a risk of considerable consequences indeed exists, such as will trigger the
fight to exercise armed force in self-defense.' 35 Certainly the right of self-defense
can always be abused, but this is just to state the obvious. Self-defense can even
be abused by an individual claiming that a personal attack against him had
occurred. All legal doctrines can be abused, but that does not make them all
suspect. The potential for abuse is reduced though if the events are carefully
scrutinized, evaluated, and analyzed in a reasonable and evenhanded manner.1
6
"It seems perfectly evident," according to Roberto Ago, "that a State which
considers itself the victim of an armed attack or, in more general terms, of
conduct entitling it to react in self-defence against the author of that conduct,
should not have to seek anybody's permission beforehand to do so; to maintain
the opposite would be to contradict the very essence of the notion of self-
defence."'3 7 Thus, as Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts point out, "[i]n practice it
is for every state to judge for itself, in the first instance, whether a case of
necessity in self-defence has arisen."' 3
134. Rainer Grote, Between Crime Prevention and the Laws of War: Are the Traditional Categories of
International Law adequate for Assessing the Use of Force against lIternational Terrorism?, at 31-32,
Conference "Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law," Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law (Jan. 2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-
terrorism/presentation.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
135. See, e.g., id. at 32. Rainer Grote believes that it is incumbent upon the State that acts to demonstrate
significant verification of the terrorist threat and its immediacy. See id.
136. Cf DINSTEIN, WAR, supra note 108, at 191.
137. Ago, eighth report, supra note 128, at 70.
138. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 41, at 422; see OPPENHEIM, 1 A TREATISE, supra
note 41, at 299.
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VIII. THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST TERRORISTS AND STATES THAT AID
AND ABET THEM AND SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
RIGHTS OF STATES THAT AID AND ABET TERRORISTS VIS-A-VIS
THE RIGHTS OF THE TARGET STATE
When a State does not perform legal obligations incumbent upon it vis-?A-vis
another State, it cannot justifiably claim that its own rights, including
sovereignty, should be respected. According to Judge Max Huber, the consequent
duty of the right of territorial sovereignty is "the obligation to protect within the
territory the rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity and
inviolability in peace and in war."' 39 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts similarly
expressed the principle that "[t]he duty of every state itself to abstain, and to
prevent its agents and, in certain cases, nationals, from committing any violation
of another state's independence or territorial or personal authority is correlative
to the corresponding right possessed by other states."14 States cannot set
themselves above international law, but rather, they are subject to it, and clearly
the sovereignty of a State is limited. A State that will not, or cannot, act in
accordance with its obligations pursuant to international law cannot reasonably
anticipate that it will be able to retain the right of sovereign decision-making
identified as independence. 1' Thus, a State may not simultaneously allege that it
is unable "to perform its undoubted legal obligations," and that it has a "right to
be immune from responsibility in respect of such defaults," elucidated Yehuda Z.
Blum.1
42
Territorial integrity is not an absolute.143 It must give way to the threatened
State's stronger right of self-defense, since it is considered an abuse of rights for
a State to tolerate activities within it that are detrimental to another State.' 44 As
Derek W. Bowett astutely pointed out, "a right of absolute inviolability is not
conferred by [Article 2(4)] and the right of territorial integrity remains, under the
Charter, subject to the rights of other states to exercise self-defence within the
conditions prescribed by general international law and the 
Charter. ' ' 45
Accordingly, "the unspoken premise of the 11 September attacks," wrote Carsten
Stahn, "is that terrorist groups shall not receive an 'unwitting shield' from the
139. Judge Max Huber, Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.) (1928), II REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL AWARDS 829, 839 (1949).
140. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 41, at 385; see OPPENHEIM, I A TREATISE, supra
note 41, at 288.
141. See THOMAS AND THOMAS, supra note 36, at 77. A State that breaches its international law
obligations is likely to face intervention on the part of the State against which it has committed the offense or on
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territorial integrity of a state which is unable or unwilling to put an end to
terrorist activity giving rise to an armed attack." Stahn continued and explained
that "[t]he normative corollary of this hypothesis is the emergence of a principle,
which posits that the right to territorial integrity must, in some instances, yield to
the exercise of another state's right to protect itself and its citizens under the right
to self-defence."' 46
Thus, use of force, which ordinarily may be illegal is, under such circumstances,
in accord with international law.'4 7 "For it is the abuse of the rights of the territorial
sovereign, in allowing his territory to harbour a danger to the security of a ... state,"
explained Bowett, "that justifies the ... state in resorting to measures prima facie
unlawful."' 48 A State, which does not prevent the use of its territory for terrorist
activities directed against and injurious to another State, cannot justifiably complain
if the target State uses force in order to quell the danger that threatens it.'49 Actions
taken by the target State, which are aimed at curbing hostile activities of terrorist
groups originating in and emanating from the abetting State, may be correctly
described as actions not against the territorial integrity of the abetting State, but rather
as actions against terrorists operating in the abetting State.'50
IX. THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST TERRORISTS AND STATES THAT
AID AND ABET THEM AND SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND ITS
APPLICATION TO TERRORISM
In addition to the conditions established regarding the "necessity for the
purpose of self-defense," the exercise of a State's inherent right of self-defense
must involve "nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the
necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it."' 5 ' The action taken in self-defense must be proportionate, both in scale
and disposition, to the previous illegal act or imminent attack that required such
measures. '12 Action engaged in self-defense must be restricted to the aim of
thwarting or avoiding the injury, and must be reasonably proportionate to that
necessity in order to achieve this outcome.'1
146. Stahn, supra note 90, at 33.
147. See GARCIA-MORA, supra note 44, at 27.
148. BOWErr, supra note 120, at 40.
149. See CLYDE EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 82 (3rd ed. 1957).
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Yet, according to Roberto Ago,
It would be a mistake to think that there must be proportionality between
the conduct constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct. The
action needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to assume
dimensions disproportionate to those of the attack suffered. What matters
in this respect is the result to be achieved by the "defensive" action, and
not the forms, substance and strength of the action itself.... [A] State
which is the victim of an attack cannot really be expected to adopt
measures that in no way exceed the limits of what might just suffice to
prevent the attack from succeeding and bring it to an end. If, for
example, a State suffers a series of successive and different acts of armed
attack from another State, the requirement of proportionality will
certainly not mean that the victim State is not free to undertake a single
armed action on a much larger scale in order to put an end to this
escalating succession of attacks. 
54
Indeed, and especially considering the circumstances of constant terrorist attacks,
"it is notoriously difficult to maintain an adequate defensive system which relies
upon meeting attacks incident by incident," explained Derek W. Bowett. "Even
more important, a series of small-scale defensive measures will not have the
same deterrent capacity as a large-scale strike and may even be more costly to the
defending state."'55
Moreover, Oscar Schachter concluded, "it does not seem unreasonable, as a
rule, to allow a state to retaliate beyond the immediate area of attack, when that
state has sufficient reason to expect a continuation of attacks ... from the same
source."' 15 6 Thus, "self-defence... may carry the combat to the source of the
aggression, whether direct or indirect," opined Judge Stephen Schwebel in the
Nicaragua case. 57 As a consequence, if a State is constantly threatened and
harassed by terrorists, it may legitimately seek out and destroy the center of
organization of the attacks, even if the action taken in self-defense is of a much
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Obviously, then, to use armed force against the State from which the terrorists are emanating if, say, the host
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greater scale than each individual harassment, or is greater than the entirety of the
infringements; the desired goal of the self-defense action is to avert future attacks
or to reduce their effectiveness and frequency.'58 In the end, it seems fair and
reasonable to conclude that States "exposed to constant violence may have
legitimate reasons to respond differently to acts of terrorism than states which are
not under permanent threat."'59
After all, maintained Hans Kelsen, "severe restriction of measures taken in
self-defense may prove unreasonable in that it may defeat the essential purpose
for which measures of self-defense are permitted in the first place. ' ' '6 Any action
limited to warding off peril may lose its objective if conditions were to allow the
recurrence of that danger; "[t]he argument is not without merit," wrote Robert W.
Tucker, that "given the circumstances attending the exercise of self-defense by
nations, it is only reasonable that the requirement of proportionality should be
interpreted as permitting the removal of the danger which initially justified the
resort to measures of self-defense."'' 6' There is, therefore, "a strong case for
measures taken to remove the source of the threat ... to the security of the state
generally," Tucker explained, "provided that these measures do not result in
disproportionate death and destruction. Given the persistently avowed purposes
of the [terrorists], and the activities undertaken in pursuit of those purposes,
[their] destruction is a legitimate end in itself." 62 While self-defense is basically
designed to thwart an illegitimate armed attack, it does allow a State to engage
beyond this illegal attack in a legitimate war until victory and the aggressor's
total defeat. 63 Ultimately, "the purpose of war," explained Lassa Oppenheim,
"is... the overpowering and utter defeat of the opponent," and therefore, "no
moral or legal duty exists for a belligerent to stop the war when his opponent is
ready to concede the object for which war was made."'4
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X. FINAL CONCLUSIONS
While September 1 1th and its aftermath have reinforced for everyone the
reality of terrorism as a tragic part of daily life, a realization of the clear and
present danger to the security of today's international environment,1 65 the war on
international terror is considered by far the most critical test confronting Western
civilization. Any legal analysis regarding the use of armed force against terrorists
and States that aid and abet them must take into consideration an abetting State's
official sanctioning of, or acquiescence in, the freedom of action of terrorists
operating from within the State, against the target State. By not preventing
terrorist attacks originating in, and emanating from, the territory of an abetting
State against the target State, the abetting State violates its international legal
obligation to curb the execution of such injurious acts against other sovereign
States. Even if an abetting State were incapable of preventing the terrorists from
using its territory to carry out attacks on the target State, or as sanctuary after the
attacks, it is not relieved of this international legal obligation. The failure of an
abetting State to prevent the training and organization of terrorists, or the
providing of a safe haven or shelter for them on its territory, and the perpetration
of terrorist attacks against the target State by terrorists using the abetting State's
territory to carry them out, raises a presumption of complicity with the terrorists.
Consequently, not only do such terrorist activities constitute an "armed attack"
against the target State, but the complicity of an abetting State in these actions
may also be considered an "armed attack" under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. Both trigger the target State's legitimate, inherent right to employ force
in self-defense. Furthermore, in order to forestall serious injury to the target State
and its citizens, the target State is fully justified in engaging in anticipatory
measures of self-defense in an abetting State. Actions thus taken in self-defense
by the target State may be considered the legitimate direct response to the
unwillingness or inability of the abetting State to fulfill its international legal
obligations to halt terrorist attacks, or the imminent threat of terrorist attacks,
which originate within its borders, and are directed against the target State.
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